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Introduction
The relationship between trading with leverage and overpricing has been extensively debated (Geanakoplos, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Mertens and Ravn, 2011) . While some claim that borrowing does not exacerbate market volatility (Reserve, 1984; Kupiec, 1989; Schwert, 1989; Hsieh and Miller, 1990) , others have highlighted the negative correlations between stock volatilities and margin requirements (Moore, 1966; Salinger, 1989; Douglas, 1967; Officer, 1973; Hardouvelis and Theodossiou, 2002) .
Similarly, the effect of short selling is also the subject of some contention. Some authors argue that it improves market efficiency and price adjustment (Miller, 1977) , and reduces the probability of bubbles as it enables speculation on downward trends (Jarrow, 1980) . Others claim that short selling has a destabilizing effect (Allen and Gale, 1991) , because it leads to negative skewness in market returns (Bris et al., 2007) . Alternatively, Battalio and Schultz (2006) claim that short selling constraints would not have modified prices during the internet bubble, or during the SEC restrictions on short selling in 2008 (Boehmer et al., 2013; Beber and Pagano, 2013) .
Because there are various confounding factors that may influence market dynamics, experimental research has tried to isolate the effects of borrowing and short selling on market outcomes under controlled and stylized environments. King et al. (1993) found no effect of short selling on market prices and that borrowing increased bubble magnitudes. However, they only allowed small short positions and did not require short sellers to pay dividends on borrowed stocks. Ackert et al. (2006) constructed a market with two assets (a standard one, and a lottery asset with positively skewed returns) and found that short selling, when borrowing is prohibited, allows prices to better track the fundamental value for both assets. Conversely, borrowing, when short selling is banned, increases overpricing of the lottery asset, but not of the standard asset. Haruvy and Noussair (2006) found that the greater the short-selling capac-ity that traders possessed, the lower were prices. If the short-sale constraints were sufficiently loose, assets would trade at below fundamental values. However, the experimental literature has not investigated how borrowing and short-selling possibilities influence dynamics of traders' expectations. Palan (2013) , in his extensive survey of the experimental literature, calls for more research on the dynamics of expectations to better understand the effect of introducing of new financial instruments or policies.
The experiment reported here has two objectives. The first is to investigate the effect of borrowing and short selling on dynamics of traders' expectations and market outcomes. Specifically, we consider the effect of short selling and borrowing on (1) price patterns, (2) expectation dynamics, and (3) the trading strategies employed, as well as their relationships with market outcomes and earnings. We also verify whether borrowing increases prices and short selling lowers prices, and measure which effect is stronger.
The second objective is to consider whether the relationship between cognitive ability, measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick et al., 2005) , and earnings as well as market outcomes reported in recent studies (Corgnet et al., 2015; Breaban and Noussair, 2015; Noussair et al., 2016; Akiyama et al., 2017) , generalize to markets with borrowing and short selling.
To do so, we conduct a set of laboratory experiments in which traders make forecasts of the future price trajectory, as in Haruvy et al. (2007) and Carle et al. (2017) . Each trader participates in two consecutive markets, allowing us to gauge the effect of experience. There are four treatments organized in a 2x2 design. The factors are whether or not margin buying is allowed, and whether short selling is permitted or not.
We confirm that borrowing increases, and short selling reduces, market prices. Nonetheless, the differences are not statistically significant because of large within-treatment variations in the outcomes. Some of the difference is explained by the differences in the median CRT scores of subjects across each market. We also find that more frequent use of a passive (or fun-damentalist) trading strategy is negatively related to the magnitude of mispricing, and positively associated with earnings. The relationships between CRT scores, trading strategies and market dynamics, as well as the dynamics of expectations, observed in our data is consistent with what has been reported in the literature on markets without short-selling and borrowing possibilities. Thus, we conclude that these findings generalize to markets where borrowing and short selling are possible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental protocol is described in section 2. Section 3 presents the results of the effects of borrowing and short selling on market prices (subsection 3.1), traders' expectations (subsection 3.2) and traders' strategies (subsection 3.3). Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes.
Experimental design 2.1 Procedures common to all treatments
A set of computerized experiments were conducted at the LEEM at the University of Montpellier, France, between February and March, 2016 . 1 A total of 210 student and non-student subjects registered in LEEM's subject database, who have never been in similar asset market experiments, participated. Each session consisted of two identical, independent and sequential 10-period markets. Each subject could participate in only one session. Sessions lasted about two and a half hours. Subjects earned on average 25 euros, in addition to a show up fee of 5 Euros.
Our experimental design is similar to those of Haruvy et al. (2007) , Carle et al. (2017) and Akiyama et al. (2014 Akiyama et al. ( , 2017 . In each market, traders can buy and sell an asset with a lifetime of 10 periods. At the end of each period, each unit of asset pays a dividend of either 24 or 48 ECU (experimental currency units) with an equal probability. Thus, the expected dividend per 1 The experiment was computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) 4 period is 36 ECU per asset. After the final dividend payment in period 10, the asset loses its value. Accordingly, at the beginning of period t, the asset's (risk neutral) fundamental value is FV t = 36(11 − t). At the beginning of period 1 of each market, each subject is endowed with 10 units of the asset and 3600 ECU. The exchange rate between ECU and Euros is 1 euro = 360 ECU.
We employ a call market to trade the asset, as in Akiyama et al. (2014 Akiyama et al. ( , 2017 , Haruvy et al. (2007) and Carle et al. (2017) . The call market rule facilitates the elicitation of price forecasts, because there is a unique and unambiguous price in each period. In a call market, all traders simultaneously submit their buy and/or sell orders. If trader i submits a buy order in period t, she must specify the highest price at which she is willing to buy (b i t for bid) and the maximum quantity she is willing to buy at that price (d i t for quantity demanded). If she submits a sell order, she must specify the lowest price at which she is willing to sell (a i t for ask) and the maximum quantity to sell at that price (s i t for quantity supplied). 2 Once all orders have been submitted, they are aggregated to calculate a market clearing price. 3 Transactions are realized for those orders for which the bid (ask) is greater (less) than or equal to the market clearing price. 4 At the beginning of each period, subjects were asked to predict market prices for all of the remaining periods before submitting their orders, as in Haruvy et al. (2007) and Akiyama et al. (2014 Akiyama et al. ( , 2017 . Thus, in period t, each subject had to forecast 11 − t prices, which corresponded to a total of 55 predictions over the 10 periods. Each forecast that was between 90% and 110% of the realized market price in the period predicted yielded a bonus of 36 ECU. 5
The pre-recorded instructions were played while subjects followed it along on their own printed copy. The instructions were available to the subjects throughout the experiment. 6 At the end of the two consecutive 10-period markets, subjects answered a 7-question version of the CRT (Frederick, 2005) . We selected the 3 first questions of Finucane and Gullion (2010) and the last 4 questions of Toplak et al. (2014) . No monetary incentive was provided for correct answers.
The treatments
There are four treatments. Nine sessions, each involving six traders, were run under each treatment. 7 In the Baseline treatment (hereafter BL), no short selling and no borrowing is allowed. In the Borrowing treatment (BW), borrowing is allowed but short selling is not. In addition to the 3600 ECU given at the beginning of each market, 3600 ECU are lent to each trader. 8 This additional cash lent must be repaid entirely by the end of each market. 9
In the Short Selling treatment (SS), short selling is allowed but borrowing is not. Any trader can hold a short position of up to 10 shares (a position equal to -10 shares). For every asset sold short at the end of each period, the trader has to pay the dividend randomly selected by the computer. The dividend paid for each stock sold short is automatically deducted from the trader's available cash. The initial total value of stocks available for short sale, 360*10=3600 ECU, is equal to the amount of cash lent in the borrowing treatment. This perfect symmetry facilitates comparisons between these two treatments. Finally, in the fourth treatment (BWSS), short selling and borrowing are both allowed. As in the SS treatment, each trader can hold a short position of up to 10 units. As in the BW treatment, 3600 ECU are lent to each trader and must be returned at the end of each market. 10 6 The experiment was conducted in French. An English translation is provided in the appendix. 7 The exception is the Short Selling treatment, in which only eight sessions were conducted. 8 By allowing a borrowing leverage of 2:1, equivalent to a 50% margin requirement., we have deliberately chosen to follow the margin requirement set up by the Federal Reserve Board in the United States since 1974.
9 If a trader cannot repay the borrowed funds at the end of the market, he is considered to be bankrupt. In this case, the amount he can not repay is automatically deducted from the show-up fee of 5 Euros.
10 One subject went bankrupt in this treatment, the only one to do so in all the four treatments. Thus, regardless of the treatment, we observe that subjects trade at prices closer to FV after gaining some experience in trading in the same environment with the same group of subjects, The relationship between the CRT scores of market participants and mis-pricing replicates the findings by Breaban and Noussair (2015) and Noussair et al. (2016) . As reported in Table 2, we observe, in Market 1, statistically significant negative relationships between median CRT scores of market participants and volatility and six of our mis-pricing measures. Such relationships, however, are not observed in Market 2, where prices consistently track fundamentals more closely. In the next subsection, we analyze the dynamics of forecasts. In the panel PoE 1 of Figure 2 , we observe that, for Market 1, the average forecasts are initially constant for all periods in all the treatments. This is similar to the finding of Haruvy et al. (2007) . Traders initially do not anticipate the increasing prices in the first few periods of the market nor the decreasing prices in the later periods. They do not expect that prices will follow the FV either. Moreover, we can clearly see that the predictions under BW tend to be above the others, while in SS they tend to be below. These results indicate that there can be a treatment effect regarding forecasts at the outset of market.
Traders' forecasts
Contrasting the dynamics of forecasts shown in Figure 2 with the dynamics of prices shown in Figure 1 , we note that forecasts made in period t tend to anticipate constant prices at the level of those of period t − 1, which indicates that traders simply adjust their forecasts based on the previous price.
In Market 2, traders' expectations are generally lower than in Market 1 for all periods of We now proceed to further analyze the forecast dynamics by extending the framework proposed by Haruvy et al. (2007) to allow for comparison across four treatments as follows:
where f t+k i,m,t is the price forecast submitted in period t for the period t + k of market m by trader i. BW, BWSS and SS are treatment dummy variables.
Periodtrend m,t corresponds to the movement of the last prices and expectations of the current market between t + k − 2 and t + k − 1. This indicator catches the concept that a trader will anticipate the same percentage price change between t + k − 1 and t + k as the one between t + k − 2 and t + k − 1.
Markettrend m,t incorporates the idea that a trader takes into account the price dynamics that occurred during the same periods of the previous market to form his expectations in the current market. This implies that a trader will anticipate the same percentage price change between t + k − 1 and t + k in the current market as the one which occurs between t + k − 1 and t + k in the previous one. This is defined for Market 2 in our data. 12 Finally, FV t is the component which measures the extent to which a trader integrates the FV of the asset in the formation of his beliefs. 12 The definitions of Periodtrend m,t and Markettrend m,t are presented in Appendix B.
14 This regression allows us to isolate the effects directly related to treatments and those related to the price dynamics of the current market (Periodtrend m,t ) and of the previous market (Markettrend m,t ). Table 3 reports the results of multilevel regressions (MLM) for Markets 1 and 2 (the two left hand columns) and the random effects (RE) regressions (the two right hand columns). 13 While we will mainly discuss the results of the MLM regressions, we report the standard RE approach in the same table to show how divergent conclusions might be drawn. We consider the MLM approach to be relevant, since it allows the separation of the variance at many levels and exploration of variations in effects across and within various clusters. Thus, it enables us to evaluate variables both within and between clusters. 14 In Market 1, Periodtrend is significant. This result confirms the influence of past prices in the current market in the formation of traders' expectations. Moreover the interaction coefficients between Periodtrend and dummy treatment variables are not significant, which confirms that the process of expectation formation is common in all four treatments. The difference in expectations between treatments results from differences in price histories, rather than any differences in the expectation formation process itself. The coefficients for FV are not significant, 13 To analyse this regression, we offer two statistical methodologies. First, we run a random effects regression (RE) in a panel data framework to account for dependencies at the subject level. The second approach is new in experimental finance and consists of building multilevel models (MLM). This technique is an extension of random and mixed effects models. As it is proposed with random effects models in a panel data framework, which identify each subject as a cluster, multilevel modeling allows many levels of clusters and their inter-dependencies to be considered, so as to better determine where the statistical effects come from. Moffatt (2016) highlights how some significant treatment effects can be reduced or even eliminated when some clusters are identified and taken into account. Using multilevel modeling, we first consider the subjects' cluster, since there are 55 observations (here f t+k i,m,t ) for each of the 210 subjects. We then look at the market cluster, as there are 35 markets in which subjects' forecasts can be dependent on each other (correlated), which could imply a significant variance at the market-level. These two clusters are identified through a subject-specific random effect and a market-specific random effect. The theoretical presentation of the multilevel model, the procedures, and the selection criteria of the MLM regressions are summarized in Appendix C. Treatment effects are captured by dummy treatment variables, through differences in intercepts and interaction coefficients of these dummy variables with the explanatory variables.
14 Here, our MLM selection procedure selected the model with random slopes for both subject and market clusters, because of a better fit. Besides, this procedure confirms that the intercepts and the slopes of the explanatory variables vary across subjects and markets, because of dependencies within clusters. Moreover, all standard deviations at the subject and market levels (in red) are significantly different from zero, which implies that there are large heterogeneities across markets and subjects. 15 demonstrating the lack of a connection between beliefs and the fundamental value. Finally, in the RE (random-effect) regression, all coefficients are significant (except β 15 ). This result is in contrast with the MLM approach and shows how the impact of identifying clusters and their variance can change coefficients and significance, and thus the interpretation of the results. We can also note that AIC, BIC and log likelihood are better in the MLM models.
In Market 2, Periodtrend and Markettrend are both significant, while FV is not. These results are very close to those in Haruvy et al. (2007) , indicating that expectations are formed adaptively based on observed past prices in the previous and current markets. Moreover, there is no statistical significance between treatments in any intercept or interaction term at the 5% level, indicating a common expectation formation rule in the four treatments in Market 2. 
Trading strategies
We classify traders based on their trading behavior, following the typology proposed in the theoretical model of De Long et al. (1990) and implemented by Haruvy et al. (2006 Haruvy et al. ( , 2014 and Breaban and Noussair (2015) . We consider three types of trading behavior: passive traders, feedback traders, and rational speculators. We modify, however, the classification of Haruvy et al. (2006 Haruvy et al. ( , 2014 and Breaban and Noussair (2015) , to take advantage of the fact that we have belief data.
Passive traders offer bid (ask) prices below (above) the fundamental value in the current period. A trader is considered as following a passive trading strategy in the current period if:
with the index i for the trader, t for the period and m for the market, a (b) is the ask (bid) and FV is the fundamental value of the asset.
Feedback traders trade on momentum, trying to buy if they observe increasing past prices, as they expect prices will continue to rise. Conversely, they try to sell if they note decreasing past prices, as they expect prices will keep falling. We classify a trader as following a feedback strategy in period t, if : 
with p t−k,m equals to the price in period t − k of market m, d i t,m and s i t,m are the quantity demanded and supplied by subject i in period t of market m, and f t i,m,t is the forecasted period t price submitted by subject i in period t for market m.
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Finally, rational speculators anticipate the prices in the next period and trade on them, looking specifically at the difference between the next period price and the current period price. They try to buy in the current period, if they believe that the next period's price will be higher than the current one, and try to sell if they believe that the price for the next period will be lower. A trader is considered as a rational speculator in period t if 
If a subject is considered as following none of these three strategies in period t, then she is classified as "No-type" for this period.
We check if a subject is following one of the four trading strategies (including "No type") in each period t (from period 3 to 9). We attribute a score of 1 if the player is compliant with the definition of the strategy, otherwise 0. We then normalize these strategy points by period among the four strategy types so that they sum up to one. Therefore, at period t, if a subject's behavior is consistent with more than one strategy, we weight them less, compared to a situation where it is consistent with a single strategy. For each subject, we then normalize the scores over the seven periods considered (3 -9) for each strategy to determine the "normalized strategy score" for each trading strategy for the market. Figure 4 and 5 show the distribution of normalized strategy scores in each of the four treatments in Markets 1 and 2, respectively. Because the normalized scores of the four classifications add up to one for each subject, we use a simplex plot by adding the scores of rational speculation and feedback strategies. These two scores are shown separately in the scatter plots in the bottom panel. Each point in the simplex and scatter plot represents a subject. In the simplex plots, the height of a point from the edge of the triangle that is opposite of the apex labeled R+F represents the joint score of rational speculation and feedback strategies. Thus, if a point is on R+F apex, the joint score of these two strategies for this subject is one, meaning that this subject has followed the behavior consistent with either of these two strategies throughout the market session. Similarly, if a point is located on N apex, then the score for no-type for this subject is one, thus, this subject did not demonstrate behavior consistent with the passive, feedback and rational speculation strategies in any of the seven periods. The score for the passive strategy can be read in a similar manner by the height of a point from the edge that is opposite of the Apex P.
We investigate the relationships between average normalized scores of market participants and market outcomes. Table 4 reports the results of regressing various measures of price dynamics on the average normalized score of feedback, passive, and rational speculation strategies for Markets 1 and 2. We pool the data from the four treatments.
For Market 1 (shown in the top panel), we clearly observe that a higher average score for the passive strategy significantly reduces the magnitude of mis-pricing. We also observe that the average score for rational speculator is negatively correlated with the magnitude of volatility.
These significant relationships between the score of passive and rational speculation strategies are also observed for Market 2 (shown in the bottom panel). There is, however, no statistically significant relationship between the average score of the feedback strategy and mis-pricing in Market 1.
We now consider the relationship between the normalized score of a subject and the profit obtained. Table 5 shows, both for pooled data and for each of four treatments separately, the result of regressing the end of market profit from trading 15 on score of passive, feedback, and rational speculation strategy.
We observe that a higher score for the passive strategy is associated with a greater profit in both Markets 1 and 2. In Market 1, a higher score of rational speculation is also weakly asso- ciated with the higher profit in pooled data (which is mainly coming from the strong positive relationship between this score and profit in BWSS treatment). We do not observe statistically significant relationship between the profit and the score of the feedback strategy (except at 10% in Market 1). Finally, we find that getting a high score as "No type", which means that traders do not follow any of the three strategies identified, generates significantly lower profits in Market 1, in pooled data. Therefore, this result shows the interest of studying these strategies.
Conclusion
This experiment allowed us to explore the relationships between market price dynamics and traders' forecasts and strategies, in an experimental asset market featuring short selling and/or borrowing. We observe that short selling alone reduces, although not in a statistically significant manner, price levels, price deviations from the fundamental value, volatility and price fluctuations. Conversely, borrowing increases overvaluation, deviations from the fundamental value, volatility and price fluctuations, though not significantly. The effects of the combination of these two types of leverage are are not systematic and depend on the variables and the periods that are being considered.
We believe the absence of statistically significant treatment effects on market outcomes are due to large within-treatment variation in the outcome. We show, through multi-level modeling, that the dynamics of forecasts depend strongly on subjects and markets, and less so on whether short selling and borrowing are possible.
We have also shown that a number of results that have been reported in markets without short selling and borrowing generalize to settings in which these types of leverage are permitted. Namely, we observe negative relationships between the cognitive ability of market participants and mispricing and volatility. We also find that greater use of the passive strategy is associated with smaller market mispricing and greater individual earnings. These results lead us to believe that these patterns are general relationships that apply to a broad class of asset markets.
